useful account of the structure of the mind in purely non-spatial terms, using such units of structure as £ ideas' or * dispositions ' of various kinds, all in functional relations and active interplay with one another. And the type of causation in terms of which explanation would be mainly rendered and understanding achieved would be teleological, since the actions of men are so obviously and undeniably purposive in the main.

The more profitable types of current psychology approximate to this purely non-spatial account of mind ; they owe little to knowledge of the nervous system. I would mention as examples, the psychology of Stout, that of Spearman, that of Freud, and my own as succinctly presented in my *Energies of Men.* And this is for no lack of acquaintance with physiology. I myself began as a physiologist whose chief ambition was to promote knowledge of the nervous system in every possible manner. But I have to confess that (as the sequence of my books clearly shows, from my *Physiological Psychology* to my *Energies of Men,* covering a period of more than thirty years) I have learnt to rely less and less upon physiology. And this although I regard psychology (logically or in the future ideal state of the sciences), as a branch or department of physiology : if that name be retained, as I think it should be, as the most comprehensive name for the science which directly studies the functioning of the human organism.

Or let the doubting biologist consider any or all of the social sciences, the sciences of the special fields of

human activity, say politics or economics. It is not clear that these, being concerned with the actions of men singly and in various forms of association, must build themselves from generalizations concerning observed forms of